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We revisit the “ε-intelligence” model of To´th et al. (2011), that was proposed as a minimal
framework to understand the square-root dependence of the impact of meta-orders on volume in
financial markets. The basic idea is that most of the daily liquidity is “latent” and furthermore
vanishes linearly around the current price, as a consequence of the diffusion of the price itself.
However, the numerical implementation of To´th et al. (2011) was criticised as being unrealistic,
in particular because all the “intelligence” was conferred to market orders, while limit orders were
passive and random. In this work, we study various alternative specifications of the model, for
example allowing limit orders to react to the order flow, or changing the execution protocols. By
and large, our study lends strong support to the idea that the square-root impact law is a very
generic and robust property that requires very few ingredients to be valid. We also show that the
transition from super-diffusion to sub-diffusion reported in To´th et al. (2011) is in fact a cross-over,
but that the original model can be slightly altered in order to give rise to a genuine phase transition,
which is of interest on its own. We finally propose a general theoretical framework to understand
how a non-linear impact may appear even in the limit where the bias in the order flow is vanishingly
small.
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding price impact is arguably one of the
most important problems in financial economics. From a
theoretical standpoint, price impact is the transmission
belt that allows private information to be reflected by
prices. But by the same token, it is also the very mech-
anism by which prices can be distorted, or even crash,
under the influence of uninformed trades and/or fire-sale
deleveraging. Price impact is also a cost for trading firms
– in fact the dominant one when assets under manage-
ment become substantial. As a rough order of magnitude,
impact costs for individual stocks are ten times larger
than fixed costs for a firm that trades a mere 1% of the av-
erage daily volume. Now, the simplest guess is that price
impact should be linear, i.e. proportional to the (signed)
volume of a transaction. This is in fact the assumption
of the seminal microstructure model proposed by Kyle in
1985 [1]. This paper has had a profound influence on the
field, with over 6000 citations as of mid-2013. A linear
impact model is at the core of many different studies,
concerning for example optimal execution strategies, liq-
uidity estimators, agent based models, volatility models,
etc.
Quite surprisingly, however, the last 15 years have wit-
nessed mounting empirical evidence invalidating the sim-
ple linear impact framework, suggesting instead a sub-
linear, square-root like growth of impact with volume,
often dubbed the “square-root impact law”.1 One should
however carefully distinguish at this point different def-
initions of “price impact” that lead to very different de-
pendence in volume. For example, the average impact of
1 Empirical papers consistently measuring an impact curve close
to square root date back to 1997 [3], see also [2, 4, 5] and Refs.
therein. More recent results again support the same law, see
[6–8] and Figs. 1 and 2 below.
a single market order is found to be a strongly concave
function of the volume, with a significant dependence on
the microstructure (tick size, order priority, etc.). The
concavity is primarily the result of a conditioning effect:
the size of a market order very rarely exceeds the total
volume of limit orders that sit at the opposite best price.
Therefore, large market orders match large outstanding
volumes, and result in small price changes.
The square-root impact law that we have been refer-
ring to above is both more relevant and more universal.
It concerns the average impact of a “meta-order” of size
Q, which is a sequence of orders in the same direction
from the same investor, incrementally executed in the
market using either market or limit orders, that sum up
to a certain quantity Q. This definition is more relevant
because trades are usually much too large to be executed
in a single shot, but must rather be fragmented in (many)
small orders that are executed progressively. The impact
of a meta-order is also surprisingly universal: the square-
root law has been reported by many different groups, and
seems to hold for completely different markets (equities,
futures, FX, etc.), epochs (from the mid-nineties, when
liquidity was provided by market makers, to the present
day electronic markets), microstructure (small ticks vs.
large ticks), market participants and underlying trading
strategies (fundamental, technical, etc.) and style of ex-
ecution (using limit or market orders – see Fig. 1; with
high or low participation rate, etc.). In all these cases,
the average relative price difference I between the first
and the last trade of a meta-order of volume Q is well
described by the following law:
I = Y σD
(
Q
VD
)δ
, (1)
where δ is an exponent in the range 0.4 – 0.7, Y is a co-
efficient of order unity and σD, VD are respectively daily
volatility and daily traded volume [2, 4, 5], see also [6–
8]. The proprietary data of CFM published in [2] corre-
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2sponds to nearly 500,000 meta-orders between June 2007
and December 2010 on a variety of futures contracts, and
leads to δ ≈ 0.5 for small tick contracts and δ ≈ 0.6 for
large tick contracts, for Q ranging from a few 10−4 to a
few percent of the average daily liquidity. Newer data up
to the end of 2012 leave these estimates unchanged. As
an illustrative example, we plot in Fig. 1 the impact curve
obtained for a specific futures contract (GBP), while in
Fig. 2 we represent the impact exponents estimated on
a set of representative futures contracts. CFM’s data on
individual stocks is also compatible with δ ≈ 0.5−0.7 for
all geographical zones.
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FIG. 1. Impact of CFM trades on the GBP futures mar-
ket, obtained by averaging over 3× 104 meta-orders executed
during the period 2008–2012. The full lines with symbols in
the main plot correspond to two styles of execution of the
meta-order (either with a mix of limit and market orders, or
exclusively with limit orders). The average impact in the two
cases appears to be the same. The soft dashed lines plotted
for comparison show power-laws with exponents 0.5 and 1.
The thick dashed line indicates the result of a power-law fit,
with exponent δ = 0.44. In the inset we plot the intra-day
sign autocorrelation function for the same product averaged
over all the trades of year 2012, exhibiting a power-law decay
with exponent γ ≈ 0.76.
This finding is in our opinion truly remarkable, on sev-
eral counts. First, because it is so universal (across mar-
kets and execution strategies) and stable over time, it is
indeed tempting to call it a “law” akin to physical laws.
There are in our experience not that many stable em-
pirical relations in financial markets, and this is one of
the most compelling that we have encountered. Second,
a square-root dependence is totally counter-intuitive, at
least at first sight, because it is non-additive. In other
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FIG. 2. Plot of the impact exponent δ against the persistence
exponent γ characterizing the autocorrelation of trade signs
for a representative set of futures contracts. The impact ex-
ponent δ has been computed by using a dataset consisting of
approximately 106 meta-orders, executed during the period
2008-2012. Buy orders and sell orders lead to very similar
results. The exponent γ is calculated by using intra-day data
for the year 2012, consisting of roughly 104 trades per day per
contract (market-wide). Note that there not seem to be any
significant correlation between δ and γ, in disagreement with
the model of [9], which predicts δ = γ (dashed line).
words, a square-root law entails that the last Q/2 trades
have an impact that is only ∼ 40% of the first Q/2! But
surely if the last Q/2 are executed a year (say) after the
first Q/2, impact should become additive again. This
means that the only possibility for such a strange be-
haviour to hold is that there must exist some memory in
the market that extends over a time scale longer than the
typical time needed to execute a meta-order. The second
ingredient needed to explain the concavity of the square-
root impact is that the last Q/2 must experience more
resistance than the first Q/2. In other words, after hav-
ing executed the first half of the meta-order, the liquidity
opposing further moves must somehow increase. Still, it
is quite a quandary to understand how such non-linear
effects can appear, even when the bias in the order flow
is vanishingly small.
In a previous publication [2], we proposed a minimal
model based on the above two intuitive ingredients (mem-
ory and liquidity increase), in order to rationalize the uni-
versal square-root dependence of the impact. Our argu-
ment relied on the existence of slow “latent” order book,
i.e. orders to buy/sell that are not necessarily placed in
the visible order book but that only reveal themselves
3as the transaction price moves closer their limit price.
We showed, using both analytical arguments and numer-
ical simulations of an artificial market, that the liquidity
profile is V-shaped, with a minimum around the current
price and a linear growth as one moves away from that
price. This explains why the resistance to further moves
increases with the executed volume, and provides a sim-
ple explanation – borne out by numerical simulations –
for the square-root impact [2]. By the same token, a van-
ishing expected volume available around the mid-price
leads to very small trades having anomalously large im-
pact, as indeed reflected by the singular behaviour of
the square-root function near the origin. This has led
us to the notion of an inherently critical liquidity in fi-
nancial markets. The presence of a liquidity funnel lo-
calized around the mid-price is in fact a feature which
is expected in any micro-structural model encompass-
ing the notions of ordered prices and market clearing,
and emerges even in highly stylized “reaction-diffusion”
models such as [10, 11]. Hence we expect our predictions
concerning price impact to be rather general and robust
with respect to the precise specification of the model.
Still, there is a large degree of arbitrariness in the
choices that we made to construct a statistically efficient
artificial market where prices behave as random walks,
and some questions have been raised about the general-
ity of our results,2 as well as on some more subtle points
that were not fully clarified in [2]. In particular, our
initial model conferred all the “intelligence” to liquid-
ity takers, whereas liquidity providers were entirely pas-
sive and acting randomly. In real markets, however, we
know that statistical efficiency is the result of a complex
“tug-of-war” between liquidity takers – who create trends
through the fragmentation of their trades – and liquidity
providers – who attempt to benefit from the correlated
flow of market orders by actively increasing the liquidity
opposing the flow (see the discussion in [12, 13]).
The aim of the present paper is to revisit and ex-
tend the model and the arguments of Ref. [2]. We
start by providing more precise numerical results about
the phase transition, observed in [2], between a super-
diffusive (trending) market and a sub-diffusive (mean-
reverting) market as the parameters of the model are
varied. This model is actually extremely interesting in
its own right, as an example of a random walk in an
adaptive environment, for which very few exact math-
ematical results are available. We then study various
aspects of the impact of a meta-order, in particular how
the execution style affects the shape of the impact and
how the impact decays after the last trade of the meta-
order. We broadly confirm the conclusions of [2], that
such an “ε-intelligence” model is indeed sufficient to re-
produce a concave impact function, as long as the exe-
cution of the meta-order takes place on time scales much
2 In particular by our friends and colleagues D. Farmer, J. Gatheral
& F. Lillo.
shorter than the renewal time of the latent order book.
We show that different execution styles (i.e. aggressive
market orders or passive limit orders) hardly affect the
shape of the impact function, which demonstrates that
the universality of impact concavity is a consequence of
the coarse-grained properties of the supply function, but
not of the details of the microstructure.
We then introduce a variation of the original setting
of the model, by giving a more symmetric role to market
and limit orders for ensuring price diffusion. Limit orders
now adapt to the market order flow and explicitly act as
buffers against further price moves. This specification
allows us to reproduce the long range correlation of the
sign of limit orders found in market data, which exactly
mirrors the long range correlation of the sign of market
orders. In the original version of the model [2], these limit
order correlations are totally absent and the confining
role of the order book is purely mechanical. We find that
the impact function is again concave in this setting, and
looks even closer to empirical data.
We end the paper by providing a general theoretical
framework in which all the results discussed so far can
be qualitatively understood. We sketch some analytical
calculations that might allow one to go beyond the nu-
merical simulations and compute explicitly the various
properties of the model (super- or sub-diffusion proper-
ties, temporal dependence of the impact function, etc.).
The completion of this program is however left for future
studies.
In section II we introduce the model and discuss its
properties in the absence of meta-orders, while in section
III we show that a concave impact function is indeed
observed for different execution protocols. Section IV
presents the generalization of the model in which market
and limit orders are allowed to interact, while in section
V we construct a theoretical framework in which all the
results discussed so far can be qualitatively understood.
Finally, we draw our conclusions in section VI.
II. A DYNAMICAL MODEL FOR “LATENT”
LIQUIDITY
A. The building-blocks of the original model
The basic assumption underlying the arguments put
forward in [2] is the existence of a slowly evolving latent
order book storing the volume that market participants
would be willing to trade at any given price p. This latent
order book is where the “true” liquidity of the market
lies, at variance with the real order book where only a
very small fraction of this liquidity is revealed, and that
evolves on very fast time scales. In particular, market
making/high frequency trading contributes heavily to the
4latter but only very thinly to the former.3
This hypothesis is motivated by market data, which
demonstrates that only a very small fraction of the vol-
ume daily traded on a market is instantly available in the
order book [12]. The vast majority of the daily traded
volume in fact progressively reveals itself as trading pro-
ceeds: liquidity is a dynamical process, see [12–14],
and for an early study carrying a similar message, [15].
Clearly, traders tend to hide their intentions as long as
they can, as they have no incentive in giving away private
information too soon by adding orders to the real order
book. In fact, the actual decision to trade at a certain
price p in the future could itself be “latent”: think for
example of a mean-reversion algorithm that would decide
to sell if the price ever went up by a certain quantity. We
imagine that the volume in the latent order book mate-
rializes in the real order book with a probability that
increases sharply when the distance between the traded
price and the limit price decreases. In particular, we pos-
tulate below that the latent order book and the real order
book coincide at the best quotes.
The model for the evolution of the latent order book
is inspired from “zero-intelligence” models for the real
order book [16, 17], but with some additional features
that allow the price to be diffusive [2]. In such setting,
the latent order book is modeled as a discrete price grid
populated by orders of two species (buy or sell) of variable
size. Sell orders sit on the left (bid) side of the book,
while buy orders populate its right (ask) side. Such a
book is described by specifying for both sides and for
each price level how much volume is instantly available
for trading, while its time evolution is dictated by three
types of stochastic processes:
• Depositions: An investor who becomes poten-
tially interested in buying or selling shares at a
price p places a (virtual) limit order of a unit vol-
ume at that price level. We suppose that these
limit orders arrive at rate λ per unit price, which
for simplicity we assume to be uniform along the
price line.
• Cancellations: Traders might remove orders
which were present in the latent order book. We
assume any order to have the same probability per
unit time ν to be canceled.
• Trades: A buy (sell) market order might hit the
book, resulting in a trade which reduces the vol-
ume available on the best ask (bid). Obviously, if
the volume on a given price level is completely con-
sumed, a price change is instantly triggered. We
3 It is actually worth noticing that the “square-root” impact law
has not been much affected by the development of high-frequency
trading; this is yet another strong argument in favor of the latent
liquidity models.
assume that market orders follow a Poisson pro-
cess and denote by µ the rate at which this type
of orders arrive in the market. We neglect here the
well known activity clustering in financial markets
[18], but this effect is, we believe, irrelevant for the
present problem. The signs of these market orders,
on the other hand, have long-range correlations, see
below. The statistics of the volume of each market
order will turn out to play an important role, as
discussed in the next subsection.
Notice that the choice µ = 1 corresponds to measuring
time in units of market orders. An estimate of µ on
stock markets leads to µ = 0.1− 10 s−1. In the following
we will often refer to market order time by using the
symbol t, as opposed to τ which will label real time.
Without loss of generality, we will also take the tick size
w (i.e. the spacing of the price grid) to be 10−2 (in, say,
$).
In the present version of the model, we assume the de-
position rate of limit orders to be independent of the side
of the book and the cancellation rate to be independent
of the sign of the order (but see section IV below). The
sign of market orders, on the other hand, is determined
by a non-trivial process, such as to generate long-range
correlations, in agreement with empirical findings [14].
More precisely, the sign t of market order number t has
zero mean (in the absence of a meta-order that would
lead to a locally biased flow), 〈t〉 = 0, but is character-
ized by a power-law decaying autocorrelation function:
〈tt′〉 = gt−t′ ∝ |t − t′|−γ with γ < 1.4 This choice is
motivated by empirical evidence showing long range cor-
relation in the market order flow, favoring an exponent
γ ≈ 0.5 for stock markets and γ ≈ 0.8 for futures mar-
kets (see for example Refs. [14, 20, 21] and, for futures
markets, Fig. 2).
Another ingredient of the model is the statistics of the
volume consumed by each single market order. One pos-
sible choice is to assume, as in [16, 17], that each market
order is of unit volume. However, this is unrealistic, since
more volume at the best is an incentive to send larger
market orders, in order to accelerate trading without im-
mediately impacting the price. It is more reasonable to
posit that the size of market order Vm.o. is an increasing
function of the prevailing volume at the best Vbest. We
proposed in [2] to set Vm.o. = max (bfVbestc, 1), where
b. . .c means taking the integer part and f is a random
4 Specifically, we consider the order generation prescription of
Ref. [19]: we use a power-law distribution p(L) ∼ L−γ−1 for the
durations L of trends of buy or sell market orders. By taking the
sign of each trend to be positive or negative with equal probabil-
ity we can obtain an autocorrelation function 〈tt′ 〉 ∼ |t− t′|−γ .
While the short-time properties of the model might depend on
this choice, its long-range behavior should be independent of the
details of the order generation mechanism as long as the asymp-
totic properties are the same.
5variable in [0, 1], with a distribution P (f) given by:
P (f) = ζ(1− f)ζ−1 . (2)
In this way it is possible to tune the aggressivity of mar-
ket orders through a single parameter ζ which allows one
to interpolate between the case where each market order
has a unit volume (ζ =∞) and the case where each mar-
ket order completely exhausts the volume at the opposite
best (ζ = 0). Intuitively, large values of ζ (i.e. small vol-
umes for each trade) decrease the impact of each trade,
and therefore the volatility of the market (for a related
discussion, see [22]).
The cancellation rate defines a time scale τν = ν
−1
which is of crucial importance for the model, since this is
the memory time of the market. For times much larger
than τν , all limit orders have been canceled and replaced
elsewhere, so that no memory of the initial (latent) order
book can remain. Now, as we emphasized above, a con-
cave (non-additive) impact law can only appear if some
kind of memory is present. Therefore, we will study the
dynamics of the system in a regime where times are small
compared to τν . From a mathematical point of view, rig-
orous statements about the diffusive nature of the price,
and the non-additive nature of the impact, can only be
achieved in the limit where ν/µ → 0, i.e. in markets
where the latent liquidity profile changes on a time scale
very much longer than the inverse trading frequency. Al-
though τν is very hard to estimate directly using market
data,5 it is reasonable to think that trading decisions
only change when the transaction price changes by a few
percent, which leads to τν ∼ a few days in stocks and
futures markets. Hence, we expect the ratio ν/µ to be
indeed very small, on the order of 10−5, in these markets.
B. Super-diffusion vs. sub-diffusion of prices
We first investigate the statistics of price changes in our
artificial model, in particular the variogram D(t) defined
as:
D(t) = 〈(p(t0 + t)− p(t0))2〉, (3)
where the averaging is either over t0 for a single trajec-
tory (as with real empirical data), or over different tra-
jectories for a given t0 – but in both cases t0 must be
chosen  τν in order to be in the stationary state. A
useful quantity is σ2t = D(t)/t (the so-called “signature
plot”), which can be seen as a measure of the squared
volatility on time scale t. For a purely diffusive process
(e.g. the Brownian motion), σ2t is strictly independent
5 Remember again that ν is not the cancel rate in the real (visible)
order book, which is extremely high, 10 s−1 or so, but the cancel
rate of trading intentions in the latent order book, which are
much slower.
of t. A “sub-diffusive” process is such that σ2t is a de-
creasing function of t, signalling mean-reversion, whereas
a “super-diffusive” process is such that σ2t is an increas-
ing function of t, signalling trends. A simple example
is provided by the fractional Brownian motion, which is
such that D(t) ∝ t2H , where H is the Hurst exponent
of the process. The usual Brownian case corresponds to
H = 1/2; H > 1/2 (resp. H < 1/2) is tantamount to
super- (resp. sub-) diffusion. It may also happen that
the process becomes diffusive at long times, i.e., σ2t tends
to a finite, non-zero value σ2∞ when t→∞.
The above dynamical liquidity model contains an in-
gredient that favors super-diffusion (the long range cor-
related nature of the order flow), and an ingredient that
favors sub-diffusion (the long memory time of the order
book itself). Let us be more explicit. When the memory
time of the order book τν is very short, the autocorre-
lation of the price changes is dominated by the autocor-
relation of the order flow. It is easy to show that for
a power-law autocorrelation with exponent γ, as defined
above, the Hurst exponent of the price change is given
by:
H =
1
2
, when γ > 1
H = 1− γ
2
>
1
2
, when γ < 1 , (4)
with logarithmic corrections for γ = 1. The same result
would in fact hold for an arbitrary memory time τν , but
when market orders always consume the whole volume
available at the best quote (i.e. when ζ → 0). Indeed, in
this case, each market order induces a mid-point change.
For an uncorrelated order flow (i.e. γ →∞) in a quickly
evolving environment (τν ∼ µ−1) the price process is
obviously diffusive.
However, the same situation of a totally uncorrelated
order flow γ → ∞, but now with a very slowly evolving
order book τν  µ−1, turns out to be far from trivial,
and leads to a strongly sub-diffusive dynamics.6 Intu-
itively, this strong mean-reverting behaviour is explained
by the following argument: imagine that the price has
been drifting upwards for a while. The buy side of the
book, below the current price, has had little time to refill
yet, whereas the sell side of the book is full and creates a
barrier resisting further increases. Subsequent sell mar-
ket orders will therefore have a larger impact than buy
orders, pushing the price back down.
When ζ → 0 and γ →∞, then H = 1/2 trivially since
each market order removes the best quote completely,
killing the mean-reversion effect. However, in the limit
6 This is actually the reason why the early zero-intelligence models
of [16] were unsatisfactory as models of true prices. As can be
seen in Fig. 11 in that paper, the price is indeed strongly sub-
diffusive within these models. The need for a correlated order
flow to counter-balance this effect was in fact duly noted in the
conclusion of that paper.
6ζ → ∞ where the executed volume is unity, simulations
show that the price motion is actually confined, i.e.:
σ2t ≈ σ2∞ −
c√
t
, (5)
in the double limit t → ∞, ν → 0 with νt → 0, and
where c is a constant depending upon the values of
µ and λ. This result can be intuitively understood
after realizing that σ∞ is proportional to the stationary
value of the spread: in this regime the price bounces
indefinitely in the region of the bid-ask spread, whereas
the volumes of price levels outside that zone grow
linearly in time, leading to a trapping effect.
When ζ is finite (neither zero nor infinite), an analogy
with diffusion-reaction models, studied in [10, 11, 23],
suggests H = 1/4 in the regime τν  µ−1. Within that
framework, buy and sell orders are described as parti-
cles of type A and B diffusing along the infinite price
line. The market clearing condition is then modeled by
assuming that buy and sell orders annihilate each other
as soon as they meet (A+B → ∅), the interface between
the A-rich region and the B-rich region defines the posi-
tion of the mid-point. This diffusion-annihilation prob-
lem has been studied in details, and previous numerical
results suggest an exponent H = 1/4 [24]. More formal
arguments building on the results of [25] can be found
in [11, 26]. In our model, we have carefully revisited
the limiting case τν  µ−1, and found a result compati-
ble with H = 1/4 with logarithmic corrections for all fi-
nite values of ζ, as predicted in the diffusion-annihilation
model [25].7 Note that in the order book model consid-
ered here, orders do not “diffuse” directly, so the mapping
to a diffusion-annihilation problem, if correct, does not
seem to be trivial. We have not been able to construct a
convincing argument that would show that the two mod-
els are in the same universality class, and the similarities
between the two could be misleading.
C. Diffusive prices and market efficiency
From a financial point of view, both super-diffusion
and sub-diffusion lead to arbitrage opportunities, i.e.
strategies that try to profit from the trends or mean-
reversion patterns that exist when H 6= 1/2. The trading
rules that emerge must be such that simple strategies are
not profitable, i.e. prices are close to random walks with
H ≈ 1/2, a property often called “statistical efficiency”.8
Within the original setting of our model, and much in
7 A power-law fit of the results however leads to H ≈ 0.32,
very similar to the numerical results obtained for diffusion-
annihilation problem [24].
8 Whether or not this random walk behaviour is indicating the
markets are “efficient” in the sense that prices reflect fundamen-
tal values is another matter. We believe that while the former
the spirit of [12, 20], we have two parameters γ and ζ to
play with, that allow us to tune the relative strength of
trending effects induced by market orders and the mean-
reversion forces induced by limit orders. Note that since
γ is empirically found to be smaller than unity, markets
must clearly operate in the regime τν  µ−1, otherwise a
super-diffusive behaviour with H = 1 − γ/2 would nec-
essarily ensue.
The claim made in [2] is that there exists a critical line,
in the γ, ζ plane, separating a phase where the price is
super-diffusive (below that line) from a phase where it is
sub-diffusive (above that line). The artificial market is
therefore found to be only “viable” (i.e. efficient) along
a certain line ζc(γ) in parameter space. Numerically, the
location of this critical line is approximately determined
by comparing σ2t for t = 10
1µ−1 and t = 103µ−1 [2]. This
leads to the result shown in Fig. 3, with new data.
Mathematically, the claim of [2], is the following: for
any γ < 1, there is a critical value ζc(γ), such that the
behaviour of the price in the intermediate asymptotics
regime µ−1  t  τν evolves from being super-diffusive
(σ2t ∝ t2H with H > 1/2) for ζ < ζc(γ) to sub-diffusive
(σ2t ∝ t2H with H < 1/2) for ζ > ζc(γ). We have redone
extensive numerical simulations of the original model,
and our conclusion is different. Although there is indeed
a value of ζ for which the price is approximately diffu-
sive for long enough times to be of practical significance,
we find that the super- → sub-diffusion transition is in
fact only a cross-over. Running careful simulations for
long enough times (while still in the intermediate regime
µ−1  t  τν), we see that the effect of long-range cor-
relations in the signs of the trades always dominates at
long times, and lead to an asymptotic Hurst exponent
H = 1− γ/2 whenever γ < 1 – see Fig. 4.
One should nevertheless separate issues of practical in-
terest from purely theoretical questions. From a practi-
cal point of view, the approximately diffusive behaviour
of prices observed in [2] over a certain time frame was
enough to qualify the model as realistic, and this allowed
us to move on to the measure of the impact of meta-
orders over the same time frame – as we do in the next
paragraph. Still, it is a matter of considerable theoretical
interest to define a model where a super- to sub-diffusion
transition truly exists in a mathematical sense. For this
purpose, we slightly modify the rule that sets the size of
market orders as follows: given a specific sign for a mar-
ket order, its volume is set to be a power ψ of the volume
on the opposite best Vbest:
Vm.o. = max(bV ψbestc, 1) (6)
with ψ ∈ [0, 1], so that Vbest ≥ Vm.o.. Clearly, larger val-
ues of ψ correspond to more aggressive orders, so that
property is indeed obeyed, the mechanisms that lead to statisti-
cal efficiency have little to do with the activity of fundamental
arbitrageurs. See [14] for an extended discussion of this point.
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FIG. 3. (Left) Phase diagram for the model in the regime µ = 0.1 s−1, λw = 5× 10−3 s−1, ν = 10−7 s−1. The diffusive nature
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)
, so that the perfectly diffusive regime diffusion
corresponds to S = 0 (thick black line). (Right) The same quantity is plotted for the modified model in which the order
consumption is controlled by the ψ exponent for the same set of parameters. In both cases, for any value of γ one can find a
critical ζ beyond which the behavior of the model passes from super-diffusion to (apparent) sub-diffusion.
for ψ = 0 one recovers unit execution, and the price is
confined (see Eq. (5) above). If ψ = 1, on the other hand,
price is trivially super-diffusive when γ < 1. But when
ψ < 1, the volume eaten by market orders is (asymptot-
ically) a very small fraction of the volume at best, sug-
gesting that the confining effect of the book might end
up dominating the dynamics for small enough ψ. This
is what we find numerically – see Figs. 3 and 4. More
precisely, we now find that the Hurst exponent H of the
price process is a continuously varying function of γ and
ψ, monotonically increasing from H(γ, ψ = 0) = 0 to
H(γ, ψ = 1) = min(1 − γ/2, 1/2). For all γ < 1, there
is therefore a critical value ψc(γ) such that market effi-
ciency is strictly recovered for µ−1  τ  τν . For τ  τν
and γ < 1 we expect, as explained above, super-diffusion
to take over in all cases, so our artificial market tuned to
be efficient on intermediate time scales would still show
long term trends. The model is however, obviously, an
approximate description of reality, which neglects many
effects that play an important role on longer time scales.
One is that the long memory in sign trades is probably
cut-off beyond some time scale, although this is very diffi-
cult to establish empirically. Note also that it is actually
the case that weak trends exist in financial markets!
D. The volume distribution at the best
Finally, we have studied the volume distribution at the
best bid (or the best ask). The results are summarized
in Fig. 5, where we plot the empirical distribution that
we obtain for various values of γ and ζ. The volume
distribution is very broad, and decays as a power law
with a universal exponent (independent of γ and ζ) with
a value close to −1.5. One in fact finds a peak in the
probability of very large volumes, associated with price
levels which have never been hit yet by market orders,
that have therefore an average volume equal to λw/ν,
where w is the tick size. We can therefore conclude that
the broad distribution of volumes is induced by the large
depth of the book, which forces the price process to visit
price bins with volumes ranging from values close to zero
(found in the region of the spread) to values around the
maximum depth (for yet unexplored price regions).
We find that the distribution of queue durations is also
broad, which is in our case due to the persistence of the
market order flow. Intuitively, a bid queue can survive
a long period of time if a long stream of orders hits the
ask queue, but as soon as a sequence of orders of the
appropriate sign is started, the bid is emptied after a fi-
nite number of orders (typically of the order of log λ/ν).
However, we have not found a way to derive the appar-
ently universal value −3/2 of the tail exponent for the
distribution of the volume at best.
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III. THE CONCAVE IMPACT OF
META-ORDERS
We now revisit the numerical results of [2] for the im-
pact of meta-orders, and study more precisely the de-
pendence of this impact on the style and “aggressivity”
of the execution schedule.
A. Execution with market orders
We first define more precisely how meta-orders are in-
troduced in the model, on top of the previously defined
“background” order flow that builds an unbiased, diffu-
sive price time series. Our choice is to introduce an extra
agent (the “trader”) into the market, which buys (with-
out loss of generality) Q shares within the time interval
[0, T ], by executing market orders at a fixed time rate µφ
(the case of limit order execution is discussed later). The
flow of market orders is now biased, with 〈t〉 = ϕ, where
ϕ is an increasing function of φ usually called participa-
tion rate. The relation between the participation rate ϕ
and the frequency φ depends in general on the order flow
of both the trader and the background, and reduces to
ϕ = φ1+φ when on average the trader and the rest of the
market submit individual market orders of the same vol-
ume. After time T , the meta-order ends, and the market
order flow immediately reverts to its unperturbed state.
We first keep the original setting of To´th et al. [2] and
work in a region of the plane γ, ζ, and for a range of time
scales such that the price is approximately diffusive. (In
fact, a concave impact can also be observed even in the
super- and sub-diffusive phases.)
We allow the trader to submit orders with a volume
extracted by a different distribution with respect to the
one used by the rest of the market, in order to model
different execution styles for the submission of the meta-
order. Accordingly, we introduce a quantity ζ ′ determin-
ing the volume consumption of the trader: analogously
to the case of ζ, we suppose that the fraction of volume f ′
consumed by any of the market orders submitted by the
trader is distributed according to p(f ′) = ζ ′(1− f ′)ζ′−1.
This implies that for all values of ζ ′ 6= ∞, whenever the
executed quantity Q is fixed, the execution time T fluc-
tuates according to the actual liquidity conditions of the
market. Conversely, choosing a submission protocol with
fixed T requires Q to fluctuate. Only in the unit exe-
cution case ζ ′ = ∞ it is possible to fix at once Q and
T .
Because of the bias in the order flow, the average price
change 〈pT − p0〉 between the start and the end of the
meta-order is no longer zero. The questions we want to
ask are:
1. Is the dependence of the initial impact I = 〈pT −
p0〉 on Q concave and how does it depend on the
frequency φ?
2. Does the impact depend on the execution style (pa-
rameterized here by ζ ′)?
3. What happens to the price at large times after the
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comparison show a power-law decay with exponent −1.5. The parameters used to obtain this figures correspond to the ones
used to generate Fig. 3, so that the maximum depth is given by λw/ν = 5× 104.
meta-order is over (i.e., what is the permanent part
of the impact 〈p∞ − p0〉)?
We investigated market impact for several values of
the ζ ′ parameterizing the volume taken with each mar-
ket order by the trader. We have considered execution
volumes in the range Q = [0, 100], while the trading fre-
quencies φ have been studied in the range [0.01, 10]. For
each value of Q and of φ that has been considered, we
have simulated 3×104 realizations of the submission pro-
cess and computed the average price change during and
after each execution. In all the cases under investigation,
the impact IT was found to be a concave function of the
volume Q:
IT ∝ Qδ δ < 1, (7)
confirming the results reported in [2]. For example, we
plot in Fig. 6 the results obtained for the case γ = 0.5
and for ζ ′ = ζ = 0.95. The dependence of the impact
exponent δ on ϕ is shown in the right panel of Fig. 6,
for different values of ζ ′. Note that the impact is signif-
icantly less concave in the case of unit order execution
ζ ′ = ∞ (see right panel of Fig. 6), whereas δ is found
to be compatible with empirical data, i.e. δ ≈ 0.5 − 0.6
([2, 4, 6], and refs. therein) for finite values of ζ ′, includ-
ing the case ζ ′ = 0, corresponding to “greedy” execution.
We also notice that for low participation ratio the impact
exponent drops significantly. This is due to a condition-
ing effect which favors slow execution of buy meta-orders
for negative price trajectories and a fast execution in the
case of positive price trajectory, causing a bias effect at
low φ, as better elucidated in section III C.
In order to check the robustness of the results with
respect to the specification of the model, we have simu-
lated the execution of a meta-order also for the ψ-model
described above, in which the volume consumed by mar-
ket orders is a power of the volume available at the best.
We have chosen the same submission schedule as for the
ε-intelligence market, and tested the same range of ex-
ecuted volumes and participation ratios. Even in this
case, we find quantitatively very similar results with re-
spect to the previous case, as reported in the bottom
panel of Fig. 6.
The relaxation of impact after the end of a meta-order
is a particularly important topic, which has attracted
considerable attention recently. Farmer et al. [9] argue
that a ‘fair price’ mechanism should by at play, such that
the impact of a meta-order reverts at long times to a value
precisely equal to the average price at which the meta-
order was executed (see also [27]). This seems to be con-
firmed by the empirical data analysed in [7, 8]; however,
such an analysis is quite tricky, as it involves some degree
of arbitrariness in the choice of the timescale for the re-
laxation of price after the end of the meta-order. Indeed,
we have not been able to confirm this result on CFM’s
proprietary trades. Even within our synthetic market
framework, the long time behaviour of the impact is quite
noisy. Our data suggests that the impact decays to a fi-
nite value, which seems to be higher than the ‘fair price’
benchmark, although we cannot exclude a slow decay to
a smaller value. More specifically, we find that perma-
nent and transient component of the impact obey two
different scalings: while the transient component of the
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FIG. 6. (Top) Temporary impact for the execution of a metaorder in the case γ = 0.5, ζ′ = ζ = 0.95, for the set of parameters
µ = 0.1 s−1, λw = 5 × 10−3 s−1, ν = 10−7 s−1. The right plot shows the fitted exponent for the impact function under this
particular execution schedule (solid line), compared with the ones corresponding to different execution protocols (dashed lines).
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impact is described by a concave law, its permanent com-
ponent is linear, and hence dominates the total impact
for long enough trades. This behavior can be understood
on the basis of the arguments that will be presented in
section V, where we show how the linear component of
the impact is initially hidden by a concave transient ef-
fect due to the partial adaptation of the order book to
the modified order flux. Overall, we confirm again the
results presented in [2], see their Fig. 5 (right). We do
also confirm that the initial part of the decay, just after
the meta-order is completed, is very steep, of the type:
IT+t − IT ∝ −tθ, with θ < 1. Fig. 7 shows four typical
decay curves for market impact for different participation
rates.
B. Plasticity of the order book
The shape of the latent order book plays an important
role in determining the properties of the model, namely
the diffusion behaviour and the price impact function dis-
cussed above. This will be substantiated more precisely
in the last section of this paper (see Eqs. (18) and (23)).
The stationary shape of the latent order book when no
meta-order is present is represented in Fig. 8, for a choice
of parameters such that the price dynamics is approxi-
mately diffusive (γ = 0.5 and ζ = 0.95, while µ = 0.1 s−1,
λw = 5 × 10−3 s−1, ν = 10−4 s−1). More generally, we
always find that the average book volume is an increasing
function of the price level p− p0 (where p0 is the current
price). The book profile ρ(p) increases from ρ(p0) = 0
at the mid-price, to the asymptotic value ρ(±∞) = λ/ν.
The size of the “liquidity hole” around p0 is determined
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by the price scale p? ∝
√
µ3
λ2ν . Therefore, the small can-
cellation limit corresponds to the limit of large latent
volume λ/ν →∞ and large liquidity hole p? →∞.
As shown in [2, 28], the dynamics of the average shape
of the order book can be approximately described, in the
diffusive regime, by the equation
∂〈ρ(p, t)〉
∂t
=
D
2
∂2〈ρ(p, t)〉
∂p2
− ν〈ρ(p, t)〉+ λ , (8)
where D is the price diffusion constant (or volatility
squared). This implies that in the stationary state one
has:
〈ρ∞(p)〉 = λ
ν
(
1− e−p/p?
)
, (9)
where p? =
√
D
2ν . This prediction is compared in Fig. 8
against simulated data, with no free fitting parameter.
It is interesting to study how the shape of the order
book is progressively deformed by the order flow, and
how this determines the impact of further trades. We
therefore also show in Fig. 8 the asymptotic shape of
the latent book after a long buy meta-order is executed.
One can clearly see how the bid side and the ask side of
the book become asymmetric, while the bid-ask spread
remains substantially unchanged (inset of Fig. 8). The
volume on the ask (sell) side of the book increases, lead-
ing to a smaller expected price impact for trades in the
same direction, and therefore a concave impact. Con-
versely, the volume on the bid (buy) side of the book
decreases, which implies that the impact of a sell order
coming at the end of a buy meta-order will be substan-
tially larger than both the impact of an additional buy
order and the average impact of buy/sell orders in equi-
librium. Hence, impact is expected to relax when a buy
meta-order stops, because a subsequent balanced order
flow will have an average negative impact on the price.
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FIG. 8. Average shape of the book at equilibrium before
(thick solid line) and after (dashed lines) a long buy meta-
order executed at a frequency φ = 0.0316 with ζ′ = ∞. We
considered the same parameters as in Fig. 6, except for a
larger value of ν = 10−3µ. The soft dashed line indicates
the prediction of Eq. (8) for the unperturbed state of the
book. The plot shows that after a long buy meta-order the
ask levels are on average more populated than the bid ones.
The presence of an offset between bid and ask volume in the
perturbed case also evidences that the bulk of the book can
store information about the past order flow.
C. Execution with limit orders
The execution of a large meta-order in a real market
usually involves a (sometimes large) fraction of limit or-
ders. Interestingly, empirical data indicate that even in
this case the impact function is a concave function of the
volume, quite comparable to the impact of market order
execution (see Fig. 1). This requires any reliable model
of market impact to predict concave impact function re-
gardless of the execution protocol (via market, limit or-
ders, or both). This is again an indication that market
impact is a “coarse-grained” effect that depends on the
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true liquidity and not on market microstructure. This is
why we want to ascertain that the same is true within
our numerical model and study the impact of a buy meta-
order executed through limit orders only.
In fact, modelling limit order execution is more com-
plex than describing market order execution, as the for-
mer involves several possible choices: at which price level
should the orders be submitted? How should the aver-
age lifetime of the orders sitting in the book be fixed?
What is the volume deposed with each submission? Our
choice is to consider for simplicity a stylized execution
strategy for limit orders, mimicking as closely as possible
the ζ-execution strategy described above for the case of
market order execution. We expect our results not to
be strongly sensitive to the precise specifications of the
execution protocol. Accordingly, we have introduced on
top of the unperturbed flow of the ε-intelligence model
an extra agent submitting limit orders at the best bid for
a volume equal to
Vl.o. = max(bfVbestc, 1) , (10)
with a constant, deterministic fraction f of the volume
of the best bid. As in the market order case, we stud-
ied depositions occurring at a rate µφ. The execution is
then interrupted as soon as the cumulated volume exe-
cuted exceeded a target volume Q. We have considered
the same background as in the market order submission
case (i.e., a market approximately diffusive with γ = 0.5
and ζ = 0.95) and averaged our results over 3× 103 real-
izations of the submission process. We have also assumed
that orders are never canceled from the latent order book,
implying that, although the orders might disappear from
the real order book, they are reinserted as soon as the
book moves close to their original price level.
The remarkable result is that even with limit-order
execution we still measure concave impact curves. For
intermediate participation rates (φ from 0.1 to 1), we
also found price changes similar to the ones measured
for a market order execution (see Fig. 9)9. This result
indicates that within the present framework market im-
pact should be regarded as a property stemming from the
mechanism with which the market clears volume imbal-
ances, rather than a feature depending upon the details
about how such imbalances are created. In this respect,
the concave shape of market impact should be regarded
as a universal feature reflecting the regime of critical liq-
uidity provision in which our synthetic market operates.
9 At small execution frequencies (φ < 0.1), the impact is biased by
a conditioning effect which has a different sign in the market or-
der execution case and in the limit order one. Specifically, fixing
the executed volume Q for a buy meta-order executed through
market orders favors negative price trajectories, as a trader with
ζ′ 6= ∞ tends to wait for the price to uptrend in order to exe-
cute large volumes at the ask. The inverse effect is measured for
the (buy) limit order execution case, as a negative price swing is
required in order to clear orders sitting at the bid. This favors
positive price trajectories, thus biasing the price change up.
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL:
“STIMULATED LIQUIDITY REFILL”
The results presented above pertain to the original
model of To´th et al. [2], and broadly confirm the main
finding of that paper, i.e. that the impact of meta-orders
is indeed concave, and in quantitative agreement with
empirical data. However, this model has been criticized
on the basis that price efficiency is ensured by tuning
the ζ parameter that governs the statistics of market or-
ders only, while assuming limit orders to be essentially
random and passive. Surely one expects that price effi-
ciency actually results from a subtle “tit-for-tat” balance
between the flow of market orders and the corresponding
counterflow of limit orders – see e.g. [13, 14, 29, 30] for
empirical evidence. Although the aim of [2] was to show
that one could build a simple latent order book model
that is consistent both with price diffusion and with a
concave impact, we agree that moving closer to reality is
indeed necessary to make the story more compelling.
To that effect, we now present a model where price
efficiency is maintained through a “stimulated liquidity
refill” mechanism, whereby market orders attract a liq-
uidity counterflow. More precisely, we posit that after a
market order of sign , the probability for the next limit
order to be on the ask (+) or on the bid (−) side of the
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order book is biased as:
P±() =
1± α
2
, (11)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a new parameter describing the limit
order flow reaction to market orders. The statistics of the
market order flow is still captured by the two parameters
defined above: 0 < γ < 1 describes the long-range corre-
lation of the sign of market orders, whereas ζ describes
the aggressivity of market orders (i.e. the fraction of the
opposite volume against which they execute).
The model studied in the previous sections corresponds
to α = 0, i.e. a complete decoupling between market or-
der flow and liquidity provision. For α > 0, on the other
hand, more volume is on average placed on the ask side
of the book after a buy market order, and vice-versa for
sell market orders. This prescription for limit order depo-
sition reproduces the empirically known correlation be-
tween the signs of market orders and limit orders [29], and
the long range correlation of the limit order flow [21, 30].
Notice that even though limit orders are described by a
short memory process, the induced correlation between
limit orders is effectively long range due to their interac-
tion with market orders.
Now, choosing a value of ζ such that for α = 0 the
market is super-diffusive, one can study how increasing
values of α progressively decreases the positive autocor-
relations induced by the market orders, and eventually
leads to an approximately diffusive price for a “critical”
value of α. This is summarized in Fig. 10, where a phase
diagram analogous to the one of Fig. 3 is shown in the
plane γ, α for the specific case ζ = 0.4, with a crossover
value αc(γ) for which the market is approximately effi-
cient.
Finally, we have simulated the execution of meta-
orders within the present specification of the model and
calculated the corresponding price impact. We again ob-
tain a strongly concave shape of the impact as a function
of the size of the meta-order, IT ∝ Qδ, as shown in the
inset of Fig. 11. Note that the value of the exponent
δ ≈ 0.4 − 0.5 only depends weakly on the participation
rate.
The conclusion of this section is that the mechanism
that we propose to explain the concavity of the market
impact curves is indeed robust to the precise specification
of the “microscopic” model of order flow. The advantage
of this last version of the model over the original one
introduced in [2] is that liquidity provision is much more
realistic. In particular, the long-range correlation in the
sign of limit orders [21, 30] is now correctly reproduced.
Interestingly, we find that impact is even more concave
than in the original model, with an exponent δ ≈ 0.4 −
0.5 for liquidity refill, compared to the value δ ≈ 0.5 −
0.6 found above (see Fig. 6). This is due to the fact
that the stimulated liquidity refill mechanism induces a
faster volume response to market order trends than in
the original model. In fact, the results in the next section
will allow us to relate the speed of the response to the
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FIG. 10. Phase diagram for the model with correlated limit
orders in the plane γ, α. We used the parameters ζ = 0.4,
µ = 0.1 s−1, λw = 5 × 10−3 s−1, ν = 10−4 s−1. The diffusion
behaviour is estimated as in Fig. 3. We again find, within
this setting, a crossover line that separates sub- and super-
diffusion regimes.
exponent δ: we will show that the more prompt is the
response, the more concave is the behavior of the impact
function.
V. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
MARKOVIAN ORDER BOOKS
We now outline a general theoretical framework in
which the results presented in the above sections can be
qualitatively justified. In order to do this, we construct a
faithful representation of our synthetic market allowing
us to relate the main properties of the price process to
the ones of the order book. In particular we will be able
to relate the dynamic properties of the price (e.g., market
impact and diffusivity) to the dynamic properties of the
first levels of the order book. We will show that the only
hypothesis needed to do this is that the evolution of the
order book is Markovian. Such an hypothesis is trivially
fulfilled by our synthetic market (the state of the order
book after an event only depends on its shape before the
event). Notice that, even though the order book itself
stores no memory about its past, the long memory of the
sign process t induces indirectly long-ranged correlations
on the state of the book.
For the sake of clarity, we will first present the results
predicted by the propagator model [20], which is the sim-
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FIG. 11. Temporary impact for the execution of a meta-order
in a model with correlated limit orders. We have considered
α = 0.85, γ = 0.5 and ζ′ = ζ = 0.4, corresponding to an ap-
proximately diffusive price dynamics. The choice of the other
parameters is µ = 0.1 s−1, λw = 5× 10−3 s−1, ν = 10−4 s−1.
As in Fig. 6, we use soft dashed lines in order to display the
reference scalings I ∝ Q1/2 and I ∝ Q. Impact is strongly
concave, with a weak dependence of the impact exponent on
the participation rate. The inset shows the dependence of the
impact exponent δ upon the participation rate φ.
plest setting where one can address the issues of market
efficiency and anomalous impact. In fact, even though
the predictions of the propagator model and of the above
ε-intelligence model are quite different, the structure of
the two models are in fact closely related. The anal-
ogy between the equations governing price diffusion and
market impact for the two family of models will turn out
to be useful in understanding some general properties of
Markovian order book models.
A. Linear models of price impact
The propagator model assumes that the relation be-
tween sign of trades and price changes can be described
by a linear relation of the form [14, 20]
pt = p0 +
t−1∑
t′=0
Gt−t′t′ , (12)
where pt represents the mid-price after trade t and t is
a stochastic term denoting the sign of the market order
number t. The propagator Gt−t′ describes how a trade
executed at time t′ influences the price at a subsequent
time t (i.e., it is assumed that Gt−t′ = 0 for t < t′). This
implies that the properties of the price pt are completely
specified by the properties of the market order flux t.
In order to describe the scenario of our synthetic market,
we will take
〈t〉 = ϕ (13)
〈tt′〉 − 〈t〉〈t′〉 = (1− ϕ)2gt−t′ . (14)
This allows us to model the long range correlation of
market orders through the term gt−t′ ∼ |t−t′|−γ together
with the execution of a meta-order with a participation
rate ϕ. The mean and variance can be easily calculated,
and result in:
〈pt − p0〉 = ϕ
t−1∑
t′=0
Gt−t′ (15)
〈(pt − p0)2〉 − 〈(pt − p0)〉2 = (1− ϕ)2
t−1∑
t′,t′′=0
Gt−t′Gt−t′′gt′−t′′ . (16)
Eq. (15) expresses the impact of a meta-order executed
at the participation rate ϕ, while Eq. (16) determines
the diffusion properties of the model. In particular the
process is diffusive if and only if the sum in Eq. (16) is
linear in t. This condition fixes the large time behavior
of the propagator, relating its shape to the correlation of
the order flow: as shown in [20] the propagator model is
diffusive if and only if Gt ∼ t−β with β = 1−γ2 (see also
the discussion in [14]).
It will also be convenient to decompose the market
impact as
〈pt − p0〉 = ϕG∞ t+ ϕ
t−1∑
t′=0
(Gt−t′ −G∞) , (17)
in order to distinguish the linear contribution to the im-
pact from the decaying one, which we will call transient.
Two scenarios for the market impact are compatible with
this framework:
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• The transient impact term is integrable. The
second term then converges to a finite constant and
the total impact is dominated at large times by the
linear term of equation (17).
• The transient impact term is not integrable.
The total impact at large times is a sum of lin-
ear and transient contributions. In particular if the
term G∞ is zero, only the transient component sur-
vives.
Since the diffusivity of prices requires Gt ∼ t−β , one
has G∞ = 0. It results that at large times 〈pt − p0〉 ∼
ϕ t
1+γ
2 . Inserting Q = ϕt, one then finds for the impact:
I ∼ Q 1+γ2 ϕ 1−γ2 . Realistic values of γ (e.g. γ ≈ 0.5) then
imply that for this model the impact exponent is δ ≈
0.75, with a weak ϕ0.25 dependence of the impact on the
participation rate, but at odds with the empirical results
presented in [2, 4, 5] where δ is closer to 0.5.
In spite of its simplicity, this exercise provides an in-
teresting insight about the origin of anomalous impact:
impact is anomalous when the market slowly adapts to
the presence of a bias in the order flow. Notice in fact
that the minimal ingredients in order to have anomalous
impact are (i) the fact that the bias ϕ is reduced and
eventually absorbed (〈∆pt〉 = ϕGt−1 → 0 for t large)
and (ii) the fact that it takes a long time to do it (i.e.
the propagator Gt is non-integrable). From this point
of view, anomalous impact stems from market efficiency
and from the presence of a long range correlated order
flow.
B. A Markovian model for the latent order book
The model described in the above section is an
effective one, which does not take into account the fact
that in a double auction market the price moves are
determined by the local condition of the order book. The
effect of a market order indeed depends upon the volume
at the best, whereas limit orders and cancellations can
change prices even in absence of trades. Hence, if the
description provided by the propagator model is at least
qualitatively correct, it means that the kernel Gt−t′ has
to be thought of as an effective quantity incorporating a
remarkable amount of information about the order book
structure, rather than a fundamental property of the
model.
A more accurate description of the price process, tak-
ing into account the one dimensional structure in which
the price diffuses, can be formulated in the reference
frame of the last execution price after trade number t
(which we denote by `t). The best bid price just before
trade t+ 1 is bt and the best ask price just before trade
t+1 is at. Note that if the book does not evolve between
trade number t and just before trade number t+ 1, then
either at or bt is equal to `t: the former case is when
t = + and the latter when t = −. If between the two
trades some activity has taken place in the book, then
`t is in general not equal to either of them. With this
convention, we show in appendix A that for a Markovian
evolution of the book one has:
〈∆`t〉ϕ = 〈pit〉ϕ + ϕ〈st〉ϕ ∆`t := `t+1 − `t, (18)
where the average 〈. . .〉ϕ is over all possible evolutions of
the order book, and the mid-price pit and the half-spread
st are given by:
pit =
at + bt
2
(19)
st =
at − bt
2
. (20)
Note that because prices are counted from `t, pit tends to
be positive after a sell and negative after a buy.
Eq. (18) is analogous to Eq. (15) for the impact. It ex-
presses the fact that under a constant bias the imbalance
parameter ϕ is linearly coupled to the spread, while the
average asymmetry of the book is captured by the term
pit, which is zero by symmetry when ϕ = 0. One expects
that in the presence of a positive bias, trades are more
likely to happen at the ask, and therefore 〈pit〉ϕ is neg-
ative and partly compensates the second term. In order
for the model to describe strictly anomalous impact, one
should impose the “slow absorption” condition, analo-
gous to the one of the previous section, which in this
context would read:
〈pit〉ϕ + ϕ〈st〉ϕ ∼ t−β , (21)
with β > 0 describing the slow relaxation of the average
price change towards zero:
〈pi∞〉ϕ + ϕ〈s∞〉ϕ = 0 . (22)
These conditions express the fact that in order for the im-
pact to be truly anomalous, the book should accumulate
an asymmetry large enough to exactly compensate the
spread term which is linearly coupled to the bias. Other-
wise, the impact must be linear in ϕ and no asymptotic
concavity can be present. The speed at which such asym-
metry forms should then control the impact exponent: a
quickly adapting book would give an integrable contribu-
tion (β > 1) to the average price change, and a bounded
impact, whereas the presence of long memory in the or-
der book would generate a non-trivial impact exponent
δ = 1− β.
The diffusion properties of the model (corresponding
to Eq. (16) in the propagator model) can be obtained
from the autocorrelation function:
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〈∆`t∆`0〉ϕ − 〈∆`t〉ϕ〈∆`0〉ϕ = s0 (1− ϕ2)
( 〈pit〉ϕ,+ − 〈pit〉ϕ,−
2
)
+ s0 (1− ϕ)2
( 〈st〉ϕ,+ + 〈st〉ϕ,−
2
)
gt (23)
where the symbol 〈·〉ϕ,0 indicates an average conditional
to the sign of the first trade 0 and s0 denotes the sta-
tionary value of the half-spread. Again, the details about
the derivation of these equations can be found in Ap-
pendix A. Notice that these results are independent of
the particular choice of dynamics for the book; the infor-
mation about the time evolution of the book (or equiv-
alently, the information about what happens in between
market orders) is fully encoded in the averages 〈. . .〉ϕ and
〈. . .〉ϕ,0 .
C. Comparison between the two models and open
problems
Unlike for the propagator model, we now have two de-
grees of freedom to determine the average price change:
the bias ϕ is coupled to the quantity 〈st〉 (equivalently,
each unbalanced buy trade pushes price up by half of the
spread), while the mid-price 〈pit〉 is independent of the
bias, and accounts for the average pressure due to the
book shape. In particular if more volume is available on
the ask side, 〈pit〉 is negative because large price changes
are more likely to occur on the bid side, where the den-
sity of orders is smaller. This is consistent with what we
have numerically shown in section III: in our synthetic
market a bias in the order flow is partially compensated,
while the book slowly relaxes to a perturbed stationary
value in which more volume sits on the ask side of the
book. In the numerical model, the slow relaxation of the
book takes place in the regime µ−1  τ  τν , within
which an anomalous response can indeed build up.
Another important difference between the propagator
model and the ε-intelligence model concerns the impact
exponent. In the propagator model, imposing that prices
are diffusive uniquely fixes the long time behavior of
Gt−t′ in terms of the correlation of the flow, as recalled
above. This then immediately fixes the impact exponent
as δ = (1 + γ)/2. This is the case because Gt−t′ controls
both the mean and the variance of the price process. Un-
der our general order book model, instead, we now deal
with two independent quantities subject to two different
boundary conditions (〈pit〉ϕ,0 and 〈st〉ϕ,0). This gives
more flexibility to the model, which means that there is
no longer a unique relation between the correlation ex-
ponent γ and the impact exponent δ, which will depend
upon the details of the order book dynamics.
It is interesting to notice that within our framework the
object manipulated in order to study market impact is
the average price change 〈∆`t〉ϕ, rather than the impact
itself. In this language the concavity of market impact
corresponds to the fact that once a bias is added to the
flow of orders, 〈∆`t〉ϕ will progressively decrease such
as to compensate (partially or completely) the bias. In
other words, this point of view suggests the idea that the
expected price change 〈∆`t〉ϕ is a Lyapunouv function of
the order book dynamics, as required by the assumption
of market (statistical) efficiency: once some predictabil-
ity (the bias in the order flow) is introduced, one expects
that the dynamics of the market will remove arbitrage
opportunities10. Simulation results support this inter-
pretation, as demonstrated by Fig. 12, where we show
that after a transient following the beginning of the meta-
order, the average price change relaxes to a non-zero sta-
tionary value (as the impact has a residual permanent
component). Once the meta-order is over, another tran-
sient follows and finally at large times the average price
change reverts back to zero. As a final note, we remark
that the ε-intelligence market presented in section II ful-
fills all the hypotheses required for the theoretical frame-
work presented in this section to hold. In other words, we
should in principle be able to provide an exact description
of our synthetic market.11 However, completing this pro-
gram is technically difficult and goes beyond the scope of
this paper. Whereas Eq. (23) relates the evolution of av-
erage price at time t+1 with the expected best quotes at
time t, one would need to solve an infinite set of relations
between the price gap at level n and time t+ 1 with the
gap at level n+ 1 and time t. This would correspond in
continuous approximation to a partial differential equa-
tion for the dynamics of order book. We hope to come
back to this problem in a future work.
10 This can be rigorously shown in other market models such as the
Minority Game setting of [31]. However in the setting of the Mi-
nority Game the expected price change is reduced by the action
of market participants which by construction adapt in order to
remove predictability from the market. In this context the rea-
son for such decrease is purely mechanical, because sequence of
orders on one side of the market tend to hit progressively higher
volumes.
11 The fact that the ε-intelligence agents choose how much liquidity
to take according to the volume on the best does not introduce a
dependence on the book of the process t: although the volume
taken is conditioned to the book shape, the sign of the orders is
not. Another necessary condition for the validity of this descrip-
tion is the absence of trades through (i.e., trades hitting multiple
price levels), which are absent by construction in an ε-intelligence
market. The only caveat which should be considered is that one
needs ζ′ = ζ: the market orders associated with the meta-order
and with the environment should consume liquidity in the same
way if one wants to describe the modified flow through Eqs. (13)
and (14).
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FIG. 12. Average price change during and after the execution of a meta-order for the same choice of parameters as in Fig. 7
with T = 3000µ−1 (left plot) and with T = 300µ−1 (right plot) . The area under the curve represents the price impact of the
meta-order. The figures show the transition to the asymptotic linear regime occurring for extremely long orders (T ∼ 1000µ−1),
as opposed to the initial transient regime which causes concave impact. Also notice that the dynamics always tends to decrease
the average price change, as it is expected in a market in which arbitrage opportunities are reduced as a consequancy of trading
itself.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this work was to revisit and clarify the
“ε-intelligence” model of To´th et al. [2], that was pro-
posed as a minimal framework to understand the surpris-
ing non-additive, square-root dependence of the impact
of meta-orders in financial markets. The basic mecha-
nism, substantiated by the analytical and numerical re-
sults of [2], is that most of the daily liquidity is “la-
tent” and furthermore vanishes linearly around the cur-
rent price, as a consequence of the diffusion of the price
itself, which depletes the nearby liquidity. Still, the nu-
merical implementation of this idea requires several extra
specifications that are to some extent arbitrary, and the
robustness of the scenario of To´th et al. needed to be
ascertained.
Our conclusions broadly support the universality of
the results reported in [2], which is in itself important
since the square-root dependence of the impact is em-
pirically found to be independent of the market, epoch,
microstructure, execution style, etc. It would be con-
ceptually difficult to understand this universality if the
theoretical results depended crucially on the microscopic
specification of the model. This is in fact, in our opinion,
one of the difficulty of the “fair price” scenario of Farmer
et al. [9] which crucially depends, among other things,
on the shape of the order-flow autocorrelation function
(see for example Fig. 2, which shows that the prediction
δ = γ is not supported by our data on futures).
We have proposed and studied a variant of the model
of To´th et al. where market efficiency does not rely en-
tirely on the statistics of market orders (as in the orig-
inal version [2]), but rather comes from the interaction
between the flow of market order and the “tit-for-tat”
reaction of limit orders, which tend to replenish the side
of the book that is under pressure. This specification is
far more realistic than the original one, and in fact allows
us to account for the long-range correlation of the sign of
both market and limit orders, an empirical fact that was
not reproduced in [2]. We find that the impact is even
more concave in volume than in the original version of
the model, and in fact closer to empirical results.
We have also investigated different execution protocols,
in particular one where the meta-order is executed using
limit orders only, with the same qualitative result. This
is an important finding, because there is a commonly
held view that the impact of market orders is fundamen-
tally different from that of limit orders. Although this is
correct at the level of single trades [30], empirical results
suggest that the impact of meta-orders depend very little
on the ratio of market to limit orders used for execution
(see Fig. 1).
Finally, we have shown that the transition from super-
diffusion to sub-diffusion reported in [2] is in fact a cross-
over that depends on the time scale over which the diffu-
sion behaviour is probed. Although not hugely relevant
for practical applications, this issue is of some impor-
tance from a theoretical point of view, as our model is an
example of a random walk in an adaptive environment,
for which very few mathematical results are available.
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We have shown how the original model can be slightly
altered in order to give rise (at least numerically) to a
genuine phase transition between a super-diffusive and
a sub-diffusive phase, such that purely diffusive motion
is only realized on a co-dimension one sub-space of the
parameters. It would be very interesting to obtain ana-
lytical results on this transition, on the time-dependent
shape of the latent order book and on the impact of meta-
orders within these simple models of markets. We have
provided in the last section of this paper some ingredients
that may enable one to achieve this program, within the
framework of Markovian latent order books. As a general
result, we have shown that anomalous, non-additive be-
haviour of impact requires that the liquidity buffer adapts
slowly to the order flow [31], in such a way that the
asymptotic price change induced by a meta-order van-
ishes. This suggests that expected price change acts as
a Lyapunouv function of the order book dynamics, and
as such is deeply related to market efficiency: once some
predictability (the bias in the order flow) is introduced,
one should expect that the dynamics of the market will
act to remove arbitrage opportunities. At least concep-
tually, this is close to the arguments put forth in [9, 27],
although both the detailed ingredients and the conclu-
sions differ in the two approaches. These ideas, and their
precise relation with the “microstructure invariance” of
Kyle & Obizhaeva [6], would be well worth elucidating
further.
By and large, our study lends strong support to the
idea that the square-root impact law is a very generic
and robust property, and requires very few ingredients
to be valid. It is expected to hold in any market, pro-
vided the correlation time of the latent liquidity is much
longer than the inter-transaction time. We believe that
the impact on the implied volatility of option markets, for
example, will show a similar concavity. This would sup-
port the use of this square-root impact law to discount
the expected cost of liquidation from the mark-to-market
value of positions, as advocated in [32].
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Appendix A: The Markovian book model: mean and
correlations
In section V B we presented an order book model con-
structed in the moving reference frame of the last exe-
cution price `t (where t labels trade time), and linked
its properties to the ones of the sign process t. Here
we want to show that Eqs. (18) and (23) describing the
evolution of the last execution price can be derived by
using basic properties of a Markovian order book, which
is defined as the one in which the state right before the
trade t+1, denoted by ρt+1, depends just upon the state
before trade number t, ρt, and upon the sign of the t-th
trade t. This condition can equivalently be written as
p(ρt+1|ρ0, . . . , ρt, 1, . . . , t) = p(ρt+1|ρt, t) . (A1)
In order to derive a master equation for p(ρt|ρ0, 0), one
needs to specify the statistics for the process t, which
we assume to be defined by the relations
p(t) =
1 + ϕt
2
(A2)
p(t, 0) = ϕ
2
(
1 + t
2
)(
1 + 0
2
)
(A3)
+ ϕ(1− ϕ)
(
1 + t
2
)(
1
2
)
+ (1− ϕ)ϕ
(
1
2
)(
1 + 0
2
)
+ (1− ϕ)2
(
1 + gtt0
4
)
.
This describes a market in which a fraction ϕ of traders
is submitting orders of fixed, positive sign, while the re-
maining 1−ϕ are correlated among themselves (although
uncorrelated with the buyers). These are exactly the con-
ditions specifying a meta-order submission process under
the ε-intelligence model (as described in section III). In
this regime, one can derive a master equation for the
evolution of the book via
p(ρt+1|ρ0, 0) =
∑
ρt ,t
p(ρt|ρ0, 0)p(ρt+1|ρt, t)p(t|0) (A4)
=
∑
ρt
p(ρt|ρ0, 0)
[
p(ρt+1|ρt,+) + p(ρt+1|ρt,−)
2
+
p(ρt+1|ρt,+)− p(ρt+1|ρt,−)
2
(
ϕ+ gt
(1− ϕ)20
1 + ϕ0
)]
,
which is an evolution equation for the probability of
observing a book in a specific configuration at a given
instant of time, given a starting condition ρ0 and a
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sign 0 for the first trade. The master equation for the
unconditional probability p(ρt+1|ρ0) can be analogously
obtained (either by summing Eq. (A5) by 0 with the
appropriate weights p(0), or by directly using Eq. (A4)
in order to obtain the evolution equation). In any case,
the equation for the unconditional evolution corresponds
to (A5) with the substitution gt = 0. Notice that in
Eq. (A5) the effect of market orders has been integrated
out, and is kept into account through the terms pro-
portional to ϕ and gt. Interestingly, even though the
market order process can have long memory, Eq. (A5)
only couples subsequent times.
By defining the mid-price pit and the half-spread
st, one can use Eq. (A5) to calculate the evolution of
their averages. In particular Eq. (18) can be obtained by
multiplying the master equation for the unconditional
average by ∆`t and summing over the book configura-
tions ρt+1. In order to finally recover Eq. (18), one has
then to use the fact that (in absence of trade through)
it holds ∑
ρt+1
∆`t p(ρ

t+1|ρt,+) = a(ρ+t ) = at (A5)∑
ρt+1
∆`t p(ρ

t+1|ρt,−) = b(ρ−t ) = bt , (A6)
where a(ρ+t ) and b(ρ
−
t ) are functions of the book state
ρ expressing the ask and the bid price. Notice that a
relation analogous to (18) can be derived in terms of con-
ditional averages, so that it is also possible to write
〈∆`t〉ϕ =
( 〈pit〉ϕ,+ + 〈pit〉ϕ,−
2
)
+ ϕ
( 〈pit〉ϕ,+ − 〈pit〉ϕ,−
2
+
〈st〉ϕ,+ + 〈st〉ϕ,−
2
)
,
which relates the conditional and unconditional values of
the averages. In particular by matching term by term
Eqs. (18) and (A7) one obtains
〈pit〉ϕ = 〈pit〉ϕ,+ + 〈pit〉ϕ,−
2
(A7)
〈st〉ϕ,0 = 〈st〉ϕ,−0 (A8)
〈pit〉ϕ − 〈pit〉ϕ,0 = −0 (〈st〉ϕ − 〈st〉ϕ,0) . (A9)
The expression of the autocorrelation function for this
process is slightly more involved to derive: one can obtain
Eq. (23) by considering a symmetric initial condition for
the book and by writing
〈∆`t∆`0〉ϕ = s0
∑
0
0
(
1 + ϕ 0
2
)
〈∆`t〉ϕ,0 . (A10)
After using the master equation (A5) in order to obtain
the relation
〈∆`t〉ϕ,0 = 〈pit〉ϕ,0 +
(
ϕ+ gt
(1− ϕ)20
1 + ϕ0
)
〈st〉ϕ,0 ,
(A11)
Eq. (23) can then be recovered.
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